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UNITED STATES ANTITRUST POLICY IN AN AGE OF IP EXPANSION

Herbert Hovenkamp1

A commonplace in the literature on intellectual property and antitrust in the
United States is that a tension or conflict exists between the two and must be resolved,2
or that the relationship between them presents a paradox.3 On the one hand, the IP
laws create a right to exclude. On the other, antitrust regularly condemns practices
because they exclude firms from markets.4

1Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa. My
comments relate solely to the antitrust and intellectual property laws of the United
States.
2E.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981):
The conflict between the antitrust and patent laws arises in the methods they
embrace that were designed to achieve reciprocal goals. While the antitrust laws
proscribe unreasonable restraints of competition, the patent laws reward the
inventor with a temporary monopoly that insulates him from competitive
exploitation of his patented art.
See also David McGowan, Networks and Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property,
24 J. Corp. L. 485, 485 & n.1 (1999) (recognizing tension); Aaron Xavier Fellmeth,
Copyright Misuse and the Limits of the Intellectual Property Monopoly, 6 J. Intell. Prop.
L. 1, 3 (1998) (same).
3Michael A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 Univ. Penn.L.Rev.
761 (2002).
4In addition to the citations in the previous two notes, thoughtful writing on the subject
includes Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L.
Rev. 1813 (1984); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and
Economic Appraisal (1973); William F. Baxter, Legal Restrictions on Exploitation of the
Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 76 Yale L.J. 267 (1966). See also Daniel J.
Gifford, et al., Symposium: The Interface Between Intellectual Property Law and
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Antitrust Law: Foreword: Antitrust's Troubled Relations with Intellectual Property, 87
Minn. L. Rev. 1695, 1714 (2003); Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Federal Trade
Commission, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead, Remarks at
the American Bar Association Antitrust Section Fall Forum (Nov. 15, 2001), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/intellectual.htm; Manisha M. Sheth, Note,
Formulating Antitrust Policy in Emerging Economies, 86 Geo. L.J. 451, 475 (1997).
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The conflict between IP and antitrust is readily exaggerated. Further, a
significant portion of it is explained by deep uncertainty about the optimal amount and
scope of IP protection. As long as that uncertainty remains there will always be tension
between IP and antitrust.

At the policy level antitrust draws clearer lines than IP law does. Antitrust is
concerned about practices that limit competition, and -- at least in the range of realistic
antitrust concern -- "competition" has a reasonably uncontroversial definition.
Competition exists when the number of buyers and sellers, freedom of trading, and
market information are sufficient to drive prices toward marginal cost.5 To be sure, one
should not push the point about antitrust's relative clarity too far. Many questions
continue to provoke debate, such as How strictly can we impose marginal cost pricing
on concentrated markets? How many firms are required for effective competition? or
How serious is the threat of competitive foreclosure resulting from vertical practices? or
What are appropriate remedies for unilateral exclusionary conduct?

5For the historical evolution see George J. Stigler, "Competition," 1 The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics 531-536 (John Eatwell, et al., eds. 1987); George
J. Stigler, Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated, 65 J.Pol.Econ. 1 (1957).
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But this uncertainty is not nearly as broad or deep as the level of our uncertainty
over intellectual property questions such as What is the optimal length of time for patent
or copyright protection? What is the appropriate scope of patent claims? When is a new
collection of technologies or methods patentable? and -- perhaps most fundamentally of
all -- what is the proper balance between the protection of new ideas and the public
license innovators must have to build on the innovations of their predecessors?6 This
final question accounts for many others, such as What is the proper scope of fair use in

6On the extent to which innovation is furthered by borrowing from the innovation of
predecessors, see Larry Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the
Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity (2004); Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs
& Steel: the Fate of Human Societies, ch. 13 (1999) (societies make more progressive
when innovators have freedom to borrow ideas from previous innovators). See also
Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas: the Fate of the Commons in a Connected World
(2001); Adam B. Jaffe, The U.S. Patent System in Transition: Policy Innovation and the
Innovation Process, 29 Res.Policy 531 (2000); Stephen G. Breyer, The Uneasy Case
for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies and Computer Programs, 84
Harv. L.Rev. 281 (1970); Robert M. Hurt and Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic
Rationale of Copyright, 56 Am.Econ.Rev. 421 (1966); Fritz Machlup and Edith Penrose,
The Patent Controversy in the Nineteenth Century, 10 J.Econ.History 1 (1950).
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copyright?7

7See, e.g., Wendy J. *****Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
1600 (1982).
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When comparing the United States antitrust and IP statutes one is struck by the
relative success that special interest groups have had in obtaining IP legislation, in
contrast with the relative lack of interest group influence on the antitrust laws.8 This is
evidenced by the text of the statutes themselves. Aside from the Robinson-Patman
Act,9 which admittedly is special interest legislation, the antitrust laws are spare and
most of their technical meaning has been supplied by judges. By contrast, the IP laws
have become increasingly detailed codes directing the courts to provide specific types
of protections to specific interests. As a general matter, detailed codes are a sign of
interest group compromise.10 Particularly when one looks at the industry-specific
provisions of the Patent Acts, there is no grand principle claiming universal assent, but
rather a large number of deals struck between Congress and conflicting special
interests.11 The Copyright Act is even more extreme.12 While antitrust law, properly

8See Christina Bohannan, Construing the Copyright Act after Eldred v. Ashcroft
(2004). One can only hope that the Congressionally-created Antitrust Modernization
Commission, which is currently examining whether the federal antitrust laws need to be
modernized, will not change this. See Pub. L. 107-273, 116 Stat 1758 (Nov. 2, 2002).
On the Commission and its activities, see http://www.amc.gov;
http://www.disinfopedia.org/wiki.phtml?title=Antitrust_Modernization_Commission; and
Albert A. Foer, Putting the Antitrust Modernization Commission into Perspective, 51
Buffalo L.Rev. 1039 (2003).
915 U.S.C. '13. See 14 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law, Ch. 23 (1999).
10See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev.
4, 16-18 (1984); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 Cal.L.Rev. 2187, 2190 (2000).
11See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L.Rev.
1575, 1637 (2003).
12Ibid. See also William F. Patry, Copyright and the Legislative Process:A Personal

Hovenkamp, IP Expansion

Page 7

applied, is public interest legislation, increasing portions of the IP laws are a series of

Perspective, 14 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 139, 141 (1996):
Copyright interest groups hold fund raisers for members of Congress, write
campaign songs, invite members of Congress (and their staff) to private movie
screenings or soldout concerts, and draft legislation they expect Congress to
pass without any changes. In the 104th Congress, they are drafting the
committee reports and haggling among themselves about what needs to be in
the report. In my experience, some copyright lawyers and lobbyists actually
resent members of Congress and staff interfering with what they view as their
legislation and their committee report. With the 104th Congress we have, I
believe, reached a point where legislative history must be ignored because not
even the hands of congressional staff have touched committee reports.
See also Merges, One Hundred Years, note 10 at 2235 (on greatly increased lobbying
in the IP area); John R. Allison & Emerson H. Tiller, The Business Patent Myth, 18
Berkeley Tech. L.J. (forthcoming Dec. 2003) (warning against "the definitional
gerrymandering of patent lawyers" in designing industry- specific statutes); Jessica
Litman, Digital Copyright 25-29 (2001) (commenting on the swollen copyright statute
and the influence of special interest groups).

Hovenkamp, IP Expansion

Page 8

special interest deals.

The extent of IP capture in the United States may be enhanced by the fact that
the agency that makes most of the initial policy, the PTO, is specialized, responding
mainly to prospective and actual IP rights holders. By contrast, the FTC and Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department, which make most of our public antitrust policy, are
much more diverse in two senses. First, they represent a greater variety of markets.
Second, their constituents represent a much more balanced variety of positions on any
issue. While it has not always been so,13 today it is hard to make a case that either of

13Many government brought antitrust decisions from the 1970s and earlier reflected
small business protectionism at the expense of consumers. Examples include United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270,(1966) (condemning merger in
unconcentrated market with low entry barriers, fearing a rising tide of concentration in
the grocery industry); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962)
(condemning merger in unconcentrated market, in part because it created efficiencies
that injured smaller rivals); FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967)
(condemning conglomerate merger, in part because resulting advertising economies
gave firm an advantage over rivals); FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592
(1965) (accepting FTC challenge to merger of sellers of complementary products on
theory that they might engage in reciprocal buying with others); United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957) (accepting government's challenge to
vertical merger on theory that acquired firm would favor its parent in purchasing inputs);
In re Foremost Dairies, Inc. 60 F.T.C. 944, 1084 (1962) (condemning a merger because
the resulting efficiencies gave the firm a "decisive advantage" over "smaller rivals");
Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (rejecting government
challenge to newspaper's requirement that advertisers run same ads in morning and
evening editions even though justified by reduced type setting costs); International Salt
Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (challenge to non-monopolist's requirements
that users of its salt injector also purchase its salt); FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S.
316 (1966) (accepting government challenge to Brown's practices of giving special
services to retailers who favored Brown's shoes); Ash Grove Cement Co. v. FTC, 577
F.2d 1368 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 982 (1978) (accepting FTC's challenge
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the antitrust agencies has an enforcement bias favoring some special interest group,
such as small business. While literally thousands of interest groups have petitioned
Congress over the years for special amendments to the antitrust laws, the list of
exemptions and qualifications remains relatively small and is in fact dwindling under
deregulation.14

The theory of interest groups suggests that small, unified and well organized
groups are much more effective in obtaining the legislation they want than larger, more
diffuse and differentiated groups. As a result, too much legislation ends up protecting
special interests at the expense of society as a whole.15

to relatively small ready mix firm's acquisition of a cement supplier); United States v.
White Motor Co., 194 F.Supp. 562, 576-577 (N.D.Ohio 1961), rev'd on other grounds,
372 U.S. 253, 256 n.2. (1963) (lower court accepted government challenge to supplier
setting maximum prices its dealers could charge; issue not appealed to Supreme
Court); United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (accepting
government's request for per se rule against vertically imposed territorial restraints);
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (accepting government's
request for per se rule against efficient territorial restrictions by joint venture without
significant market power); FTC v. Henry Broch & Co., 363 U.S. 166 (1960) (highly
anticompetitive decision condemning broker for reducing commission in order to make
large sale); FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948) (accepting challenge to
nonmonopoly salt seller's quantity discount program); MidBSouth Distrib. v. FTC, 287
F.2d 512 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 838 (1961) (condemning buying cooperative
for obtaining low prices on auto parts for its members); FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746 (1945) (virtually requiring competitors to verify one another's prices in order to
avoid Robinson-Patman Act violation).
14See 1A Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&249-251 (2d ed.
2000). The "classic" exemptions were labor and insurance. See id., &&219-220
(insurance), &&255-257 (labor). On the impact of deregulation, see &241.
15James Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent (1962) Mancur
Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (1965;
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While the theory of public choice is elegant, it is not particularly robust at
explaining regulatory choices across the full range of economic markets. For example,
in every American state the sale of groceries, shoes, and furniture occurs in
competitive, generally unregulated markets. By contrast, in every state retail electricity
and taxicab fares are price regulated and there may be government restrictions on new
entry. Why this pair of outcomes should be virtually universal is certainly not a
coincidence. Further, it is highly unlikely that the explanation is that electric utilities or
taxicab companies are better political organizers or have more unified interest groups
representing them, while their customers are less well organized. As a result, these
particular industries manage to obtain regulatory freedom from competition and
guaranteed profit margins, while grocers and shoe sellers do not.

2d ed. 1971). A good survey of the literature on public choice is Daniel A. Farber &
Philip P. Frickey, Law and Public Choice: a Critical Introduction (1991). For specific
application to regulation, see George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2
Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 3 (1971); and Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic
Regulation, 5 Bell J. Econ. & Mgt. Sci. 335 (1974).
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The important differences between the regulatory choices that have been made
in these markets is best explained by the basic neoclassical economics of production
and distribution. Electricity is a traditional natural monopoly and the traditional solution
to natural monopoly has been agency price regulation. Taxis are a market in which,
according to the given wisdom, transactions have to be made quickly and purely private
bargaining would yield too much uncertainty and bad results.16

The significance of interest group explanations for regulation in the United States
seems to be driven by two factors. The first is how well underlying political markets are
working. The second is how clearly policy makers understand the market in question.

If political markets worked perfectly they would yield efficient regulatory solutions
and public choice theory would not have much of interest to say. Regulation in such a
regime would correct market failures and produce efficient markets -- no more and no
less. Of course, political markets are not perfect and some are highly imperfect. As a
result, regulatory solutions are imperfect as well. The classic public choice position on
regulation is that, because of imperfections in government process, we tend to regulate
too much and we tend to use regulation to transfer wealth to politically successful

16See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise 2004
Col.Bus.L.Rev. 335, 339 (2004). Cf. P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating
the Administrative Process, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 55 (1998); Mark Kelman, On
Democracy-Bashing: A Skeptical Look at the Theoretical and "Empirical" Practice of the
Public Choice Movement, 74 Va. L. Rev. 199 (1988); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 895-900 (1987).
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interest groups rather than producing the economically efficient outcome.

The second important factor determining the robustness of public choice
explanations is the degree of policy consensus about how a particular market should
work. Special interest legislation is most robust in markets where right answers are
elusive. The more complex the problem and the less clearly a single solution emerges,
the more room for special interest groups to make their case to the legislature. This
explains why the tax code has so many interest group provisions. There is no obvious
"correct" answer to how much taxes should be or how the burden should be distributed
among various constituencies. It also explains why interest groups have generally been
more effective in obtaining legislation in the regulated industries. While the identification
of industries that require regulation may be relatively uncontroversial, the ideal form that
the regulatory enterprise should take seldom is. So once the state decides to regulate,
interest groups acquire a stronger voice.17

These facts were clear features of the American regulatory landscape even in the
nineteenth century.18 For example, toll bridges, railroads and gas utilities tended to be
price regulated, but not blacksmiths, haberdasheries, or general stores. In general, the
effectiveness of the government control over a market varied with the degree of

17See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulation History as Politics or Markets, 12 Yale J.Reg.
549 (1995).
18Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 at 105-170 (1991).
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consensus about how the market worked. If there was a broad consensus that
competition was working well, special interests tended not to be very successful. By
contrast, when little about a market is known, then alternative regulatory approaches
are less clear and legislators tended to listen more to interest groups.19

Ambiguity about the correct policy explains why the IP statutes are fairly
susceptible to interest group capture. No one really knows the answers to such
questions as what is the correct term for a patent or copyright, or what is the proper
scope of such rights, how "non-obvious" an innovation must be before it is patentable,
what is the appropriate scope of fair use of copyrighted material, and the like.

19See Hovenkamp, Regulation History, note 17.
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Over the years most statutory amendments to the United States Patent and
Copyright Acts have tended to expand IP protection. The term of protection given to
patents and copyrights has consistently been extended.20 Most other amendments to
those statutes have tended to expand the scope of protection. Good examples are the
patent misuse reform act of 1988,21 or the Digital Millenium Copyright Act.22 The
Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act23 has been described as legislation that
"strongly favored a narrow class of copyright owners, broadly but mildly affected many
present and future consumers, was intensively lobbied, and became law with little
opposition."24

20On the copyright term, see Christina N. Gifford, The Sonny Bono Copyright Term
Extension Act, 30 U.Mem.L.Rev. 363 (2000) (tracing history of copyright terms and
extensions). Since 1850 the patent term has gone from 14 years, to 17 years, to its
current 20 years from application date. A good summary of changes in the law in both
areas is contained in Tyler T. Ochoa, Origins and Meanings of The Public Domain, 28
Dayton L. Rev. 215, 222-224 (2002).
21See 35 U.S.C. '271(d). On the legislative history of '271(d), see Richard Calkins,
Patent Law; the Impact of the 1988 Patent Misuse Reform Act and Noerr-Pennington
Doctrine on Misuse Defenses and Antitrust Counterclaims, 38 Drake L. Rev. 175
(1988); Sharon Brawner McCullen, The Federal Circuit and the Ninth Circuit Face-off:
Does a Patent Holder Violate the Sherman Act by Unilaterally Excluding Others from a
Patented Invention in more than one Relevant Market?, 74 Temple L. Rev. 469, 494 et
seq (2001).
22Digital Millenium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
23Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.).
24Mergers, One Hundred Years, note 10 at 2236.
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While the degree of special interest capture in IP legislation has tended to
increase over time, the courts have been less consistent and have tended to go in
cycles, particularly where conflicts between IP and competition policy are concerned.
For example, in the early nineteenth century the courts interpreted patent rights very
expansively, with the result that relatively few patent practices were found to constitute
antitrust violations or patent "misuse"25 based on the perceived anticompetitive
consequences of the conduct. For example, in Henry the Supreme Court permitted a
patentee to enforce a notice on its duplicating machine that the licensee could use the
machine only with the paper, ink and other supplies provided by the patentee.26 The
Supreme Court permitted an action for contributory infringement against a person who
sold such supplies to someone who intended to use them in one of A.B. Dick's
machines. Henry represented a high point in Supreme Court patent law expansionism
because it permitted patentees to "tie" unpatented goods even if they were staple
commodities, and interpreted the doctrine of contributory infringement so as to reach
the seller of such staples.

25On IP "misuse," see discussion infra, text at note 34 et seq.
26Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. 1 (1912).
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In the Paper Bag case the Supreme Court also ended a controversy over
whether less protection should be given to unused, or "unworked," patents.27
Previously, some courts had either denied infringement actions based on patents that
the patentee was not actually practicing or licensing to others. Other decisions
permitted the actions but limited plaintiffs' relief to damages.28

27Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908).
The right was very likely codified in 35 U.S.C. '271(d)(4). See Janice M. Mueller,
Symposium: Patent System Reform: Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry
Standards, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 623, 680 (2002).
28E.g., Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. v. Carborundum Co., 189 F. 710 (C.C.W.D.
Pa. 1900); Dorsey Harvester Revolving Rake Co. v. Marsh, 7 F. Cas. 939, 945
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1873). But the issue of unworked patents has continued to provoke
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Finally, the Bement decision,29 expanded in 1926 in the General Electric case,30
permitted patentees to fix the product price charged by competing licensees who sold
the patented good in competition with the patentee.

controversy even since the Paper Bag decision. See Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.,
850 F.2d 660, 671 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (refusing to award lost profits as damages for
infringement because patent was unworked); Foster v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 492
F.2d 1317, 1324 (2d Cir. 1974) (taking into consideration whether party practiced
welding system patent). See also Hartford-Fairmont Co. v. United States Glass Co., 2
F.2d 109, 110 (W.D. Pa. 1924); Dorsey Harvester, 7 F. Cas. 939; Landis Tool Co. v.
Ingle, 286 F. 5, 6-7 (3d Cir. 1923): Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co., v. Toledo, 172 F.
371, 372 (6th Cir. 1909).
29E. Bement & Sons v. Nat. Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70 (1902).
30United States v. Gen. Elect. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). See 2 Herbert Hovenkamp,
Mark D. Janis, and Mark A. Lemley, IP and Antitrust: an Analysis of Antitrust Principles
Applied to Intellectual Property Law, ch. 31 (2004); 12 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &2041 (2d ed. 2005).
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Beginning in the 1930s the Roosevelt Court did a complete about face and
began to see patents and later copyrights as inherently anticompetitive and antitrust, or
the related doctrine of misuse, as the cure.31 A series of decisions both imagined that
patents conferred significant market power, even in what appeared to be robustly

31A contemporary book which well captures the change of viewpoint was written by
Legal Realist Walton Hamilton. See Walton Hale Hamilton, Patents and Free Enterprise
161 (1941)).
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competitive markets, and also believed it was quite easy for firms to "enlarge" these
monopolies simply by tying patents together or bundling patented and unpatented
goods.32

32The important precursor was Carbice Corp. of Am. v. American Patents Dev. Corp.,
283 U.S. 27, 29 (1931), which refused to enforce an action for contributory infringement
against one who sold dry ice to licensees of the patentee's patented ice box, when its
license required licensees to purchase their ice exclusively from the patentee; Court
believed that patentee was attempting to "extend its monopoly" over unpatented
supplies. See also International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947)
(condemning tying by firm that lacked real market power, holding that the power
conferred by the patent is all that was necessary to make tying unlawful); Mercoid Corp.
v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 669 (1944) (finding patent use when the
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patentee bundled the different elements in a combination patent);; Court saw the
bundling as an attempt to extend the monopoly of the patent so as to create a larger
monopoly); Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (refusing to
enforce a patent against an infringer because the patentee was tying salt to its patented
salt injector; no market power requirement other than Court's observation that patentee
was attempting to use the monopoly of the patent to create a second "limited monopoly"
in salt tablets; tablets themselves were a commodity in which patentee had no power);
B. B. Chem. Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942) (patentee who tied shoe insole
material to its patented insole machine could not bring infringement action; no market
power requirement); Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458, 463 (1938)
(condemning tying even when the tied element was an essential part of the patented
process); International Business Mach. Corp. (IBM) v. United States, 298 U.S. 131
(1936) (condemning tying of IBMs computing machines to its paper punch cards).
Other decisions include United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 156-159
(1948) (condemning block-booking of feature films as enlarging "the monopoly of the
copyright"); United States v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38 (1962) (extending Paramount to blockbooking of television shows; again inferring power from the existence of the copyright).
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That era was quite properly brought to a close, mainly as a result of Chicago
School writings that exploded the leverage theory of patents, and more general writings
that began to treat patent rights as simply a species of property, with the attendant
power to exclude, rather than as a species of monopoly.33

One result is that antitrust

tribunals today are quite properly far more tolerant ot IP rights today than they were
from the 1930s through the 1960s, and antitrust claims in IP markets have become
more difficult to prove. Now the question is whether are in danger of going too far.

Appropriate Antitrust Responses

How should antitrust respond to a regime in which the intellectual property laws
very likely grant more than the optimal amount of protection and where the ongoing
amendment process reflects significant capture by special interests? The harmful
results include, at the least, costly impediments to innovation, the high licensing and
transaction costs of negotiating through the thicket of IP rights, leading to underuse of
innovations.34 On top of all of this is higher consumer prices.

33E.g., Bowman, note 4; Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent
System, 20 J L & Econ 265 (1977). For summaries, see William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law, ch. 1 (2003);
Hovenkamp, Janis, & Lemley, note 30 at '4.2. On the history of the Supreme Court's
presumption of market power from patents and copyrights, mainly in tying cases, see 10
Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1733 (2d ed. 2004).
34On the "thicket" created by excessive IP protection, Lessig, note 6. See also Burk
and Lemley, note 11; Mark A. Lemley, Place and Cyberspace, 91 Calif. L.Rev. 521
(2003); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons,
91 Calif. L. Rev. 439 (2003); Michael A. Carrier, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox
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Through Tripartite Innovation, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 1047, 1085 et seq (2003); R. Polk
Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual Property and the Mythologies of
Control, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 995 (2003); Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket:
Cross Licensing, Patent Pools, and Standard Setting, in Innovation Policy and the
Economy (Adam Jaffe et al., eds. 2001); Maureen A. O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of
Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177, 1179 (2000); Mark D. Janis, Second
Tier Patent Protection, 40 Harv. Int'l L.J. 151, 200 (1999); Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998).
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First, it is not antitrust's purpose to interfere in legislative decisions about the
scope of IP rights, even if those legislative acts result from socially harmful
acquiescence to interests group pressure. Courts have other tools at their disposal for
limiting the power of special interests, in particular, the canons of statutory
construction.35 But antitrust was never intended to be and is not a device for fixing
special interest legislation. Antitrust was designed to correct economic markets, not
political markets.36

35See Dan L. Burk and Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va.L.Rev.
1575 (2003) (mainly, patent). More generally, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting
Statutory Default Rules, 102 Col.L.Rev. 2162 (2002); Frank H. Easterbrook, The
Supreme Court, 1983 Term--Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 Harv.
L. Rev. 4, 15-18 (1984); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 533 (1983).
36See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and its
Practice, '18.1 (3d ed. 2005); Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise,
note 16.
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Second, we should never return to the former regime of hostility that dominated
antitrust in the United States courts during the period from the New Deal through the
Warren era. Characteristic of that era were presumptions of market power where none
existed, and the general notion that patent power was easily "extended" or enlarged
through simple contract devices. Most of this law condemned practices that were not
anticompetitive. Indeed, many of them were socially beneficial devices for reducing
transaction costs37 or enabling patentees to maintain the quality of their product.38
The presumption that an IP right is inherently monopolistic, or that it confers significant
market power on its owner, is no more correct today than it was a half century ago.39
Further, it remains the case that very few vertical contract practices, such as tying, have
robust anticompetitive explanations.

37Examples are the block booking condemned in Loew's and Paramount; and many
of the tying arrangement cases listed in note 32. On block-booking, see F. Andrew
Hanssen, The Block booking of Films Re-examined, 43 J.L. & Econ. 395 (2000); Roy
W. Kenney & Benjamin Klein, How Block Booking Facilitated Self-Encording Film
Contracts, 43 J.L.& Econ. 427 (2000). On tying, see 9 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert
Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &&1703, 1711-1718 (2d ed. 2004).
38E.g., International Salt, note 32; IBM, note 32.
39The presumption continues to have legal vitality, however. Four Justices accepted
it in dicta in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16-17 (1984),
although the four concurrers expressly rejected it. Id. at 37 n. 7. See also MCA
Television Limited v. Public Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999)
(accepting the presumption for a copyright in a block-booking decision; in this case, the
copyrighted work found to have power was syndicated reruns of a television detective
show, Magnum, P.I.). See also Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336,
1341B42 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 908 (1985) (accepting the presumption
for a copyrighted computer operating system, RDOS, even though it was not the market
dominant system).
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While the evidence of legislative capture is strongest in the area of copyright,40
there is even less room for antitrust intervention than in the case of patents. Outside of
copyrighted computer software, copyrights are less effective tools of monopoly than
patents are. Setting aside software, a copyright is less likely to create market power
than a patent is.41 Further, licensing or infringement disputes over copyrights are
much less frequently between competing firms -- the typical copyright infringer is not a
rival of the copyright owner.

But antitrust can pursue unreasonable exercises of market power where they are
found, and it need not be detained by the IP statutes unless they clearly immunize the
challenged practice. Here, the principles of statutory construction may become
relevant: ambiguous statutes that reflect special interest capture should generally be
construed against the special interests that were responsible for them. First, such
statutes should be regarded as no more than private bargains, and as such they are to
be construed as any contract is. Second, and more importantly, if Congress dislikes the
construction the court gives, the powerful special interest is in the best position to get

40See Burk & Lemley, note 35; Lessig, note 6.
41See 1 Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, IP and Antitrust, note 30 at '4.2a.
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the statute changed so as to make its meaning clearer. The result is greater
transparency in law making.42

42On the Copyright Act, see Bohannan, note 8; more generally, see Easterbrook,
note 10; Elhauge, note 35.
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When a practice poses a significant threat to competition, it should not be saved
by an ambiguous IP provision. One corollary of the principle that an IP right is simply
property is that no special deference is due to the IP laws when courts fashion remedies
for proven antitrust violations. For example, ordering compulsory licensing for a proven
antitrust violation is no different than fining a firm or ordering divestiture of a plant.43
While we do not want to deter innovation, we do want to deter antitrust violations either.
While the Patent Act provides that a refusal to license is not patent misuse,44 that
provision has the same status as the common law rule that the owner of real property
has no duty to share it. That does not mean, however, that property rights cannot be
forfeited for proven violations.45 To be sure, application of antitrust remedies can get
courts mired in such things as setting reasonable royalty rates, an activity for which they
are very poorly suited. But these problems are rarely different for IP rights than for

43For a generally contrary position, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace vs.
Property Law, 4 Tex. Rev. L. & Politics 103 (1999).
4435 U.S.C. '271(d).
45See 3 Antitrust Law &710 (2d ed. 2001).
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other types of property interests.46

46In general, compulsory dealing orders pose serious administrative difficulties when
the refusal is unilateral, but much less substantial when it is the product of an
agreement. See 11 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1903 (2d ed. 2005).
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Antitrust tribunals in the United States should also take a more aggressive
approach to acquired patents, particularly when they are unused. Free licensing of
patents is an essential incentive to innovation. But acquisitions of exclusive patent
rights need not be entitled to the same degree of deference as internally developed
patents.47

A rule limiting the exclusionary power of unused, or "unworked," patents also
limits the incentive to innovate. Many innovations are unplanned, often the byproduct of
innovation in other areas. Firms in rapidly changing markets often innovate far out into
the future. At the same time, however, dominant firms often employ strategies of
patenting everything possible, whether or not they intend to use it, simply to create a
wall around their own technologies.48 The Patent Act provides that simple nonuse of a
patent is not "misuse," but this does not preclude the pursuit of nonuse under the
antitrust laws when market power and unreasonable exclusionary effect are shown.

When significant market power is present, little deference should be given to

47For an example of such deference, see SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195
(2d Cir. 1981). See also 3 Antitrust Law &708e (2d ed. 2002); Burk & Lemley, Policy
Levers, note 35 at 1666-1667; Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public
Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 389 (2002).
48See Merges, One Hundred Years, note 10 at 2220; and Leonard S. Reich, The
Making of American Industrial Research:Science and Business at GE and Bell,
1876-1926 (1985).
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patents that are both acquired49 and unused. A firm ordinarily acquires a patent, or
obtains an exclusive license, either to practice the patent itself, include it in a license
package, or else to deny access to rivals. While the first two of these activities are
almost always procompetitive the last one typically is not.

49The acquisition itself may be unlawful, under either '1 of the Sherman Act or '7 of
the Clayton Act. See 3 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &707 (2d
ed. 2002) (treated as exclusionary practice); 5 Phillip E Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp,
Antitrust Law 1202f (2d ed. 2004) (treated as merger).
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United States antitrust tribunals should also be somewhat less deferential than
they currently are to settlements of IP disputes. In general, we want firms to settle their
bona fide intellectual property disputes, and in most cases the impairment of
competition threatened by a settlement agreement is no greater than that which would
result from a court judgment upholding the intellectual property right. But the possibility
of settlements creates incentives to cartelize markets. As a result, settlements that
would constitute antitrust violations in the absence of a valid IP right must be given fairly
close scrutiny.50 In particular, the Supreme Court should overrule its General Electric
decision and permit the lower courts to scrutinize patent licensing agreements that

50For example, the court seemed too tolerant in Clorox Co. v. Sterling Winthrop, Inc.,
117 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 1997), which approved a product market division agreement
among household chemical manufacturers based on the doubtful premise that the
"Pine-Sol" trademark infringed the "Lysol" mark. See 12 Antitrust Law &2046b4 (2d ed.
2005).
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include price-fixing provisions.51

51United States v. Gen. Elect. Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926). Recent applications of the
rule include LucasArts Entm't Co. v. Humongous Entm't Co., 870 F. Supp. 285 (N.D.
Cal. 1993); cf. Sample v. Monsanto Co., 218 F.R.D. 644 (E.D.Mo. 2003) (refusing to
certify class, but noting allegations of price-fixing conspiracy in patented seed). See
also Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. v. Pentech Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 289 F.Supp.2d 986, 992
(N.D.Ill. 2003), where Judge Posner opined of GE that while the Court "upheld the
arrangement ... I doubt that it would do so today, at least without a further inquiry into
the strength of the patents and the rationale for the licensing arrangement. And see
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual
Property Law 382-384 (2003).
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The courts should also be more skeptical than the Eleventh Circuit was about socalled exit payment settlements.52 In such settlements the patentee, and infringement
plaintiff, settles its dispute with the infringement defendant by means of an agreement
under which the defendant agrees not to enter the market with its allegedly infringing
product in exchange for a significant payment from the infringement defendant. Such
deals should probably not be per se unlawful. For example, an exit payment may be
less than the expected cost of prosecuting and winning the patent infringement claim.
But they should be subject to very close scrutiny, particularly when the payments are
larger than the reasonably anticipated cost of litigation, and even more particularly when
the impact of the settlement agreement is to prevent or delay the entry of other firms
into the market.53

52Valley Drug Co., Inc. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.2d 1294 (11th Cir.
2003).
53The Hatch-Waxman Act, designed to rationalize the entry of generic drugs when
pioneer patents expires, gives the first generic filer of an Abbreviated New Drug
Application, or ANDA, a 180 day exclusivity period which begins to run on (1) the date
on which the firm begins marketing the generic product; or (2) the date of a court
decision holding the patent invalid or not infringed. See 21 U.S.C. '355(j)(5)(B)(iv). A
properly crafted settlement may entail that the prospective generic entrant will never
begin marketing the product and that the patent will never be declared invalid or not
infringed. As a result, a settlement agreement under which the pioneer patentee pays
the generic firm to stay out of the market can operate so as to delay entry by other
generics significantly. For a full description of the process, see Hovenkamp, Janis &
Lemley, note 30 at '7.4e.
Recent Congressional amendments provide that the first generic to file its ANDA,
which contemplates FDA approval to market a new generic (provided that the product
does not infringe any still valid patent), is entitled to only 180 days of generic exclusivity.
Further, the exclusivity will be forfeited if the generic producer fails to enter the market
within a reasonable time.21 U.S.C. '355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) That provision reduces the value
of anticompetitive settlements because they will be less likely to deter entry indefinitely.
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Nevertheless, the gains from an anticompetitive settlement agreement -- and
corresponding consumer losses -- could still be significant.
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It may also be time for the United States courts to recognize a broader role for
claims of IP "misuse." The concept of misuse is simple enough -- certain IP practices
are deemed harmful and must be penalized, in most cases by denial of the right to
maintain an infringement action.54 As such, misuse is typically a defense to an
infringement claim, not an affirmative cause of action. Most instances of IP misuse
involve perceived injuries to competition as well; however, the doctrine of misuse has a
checkered history. Particularly in the 1930s and 1940s the courts used it to expand the
scope of antitrust liability by finding misuse where injury to competition was highly
unlikely. Indeed, in the case of tying and similar practices, the antitrust law was already
significantly overdeterrent, and misuse doctrine went even further.55

Since that period the trend has been toward converging antitrust and misuse
doctrine, although the courts are not fully in agreement. Judge Posner's opinion in the
USM case insisted that misuse should be analyzed strictly under antitrust principles.56

54See Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 30 at ''3.1-3.2.
55See, e.g., Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931)
(finding misuse and denying infringement action in tying case without proof of power;
suggesting that the conclusion was "analogous" to finding of antitrust violation;); see
also Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942) (denying an
infringement action against an admitted infringer because the plaintiff was tying salt
tablets to its injection machines, even though infringer was not injured by the tying);
Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1990)
(noncompetition clause in copyright license constituted misuse; no finding of antitrust
violation).
56USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, 694 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462
U.S. 1107 (1983). That view is embraced in the Antitrust Law treatise, but qualified in
IP and Antitrust. Cf. 10 Phillip E. Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law &1781d
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Decisions in the Federal Circuit have leaned toward the approach that because antitrust
applies more severe remedies the standard for an antitrust violation should be higher
than the standard for patent misuse.57 The Fourth took a similar position in a copyright
misuse case.58

(2d ed. 2004); with Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, note 30 at ''3.3-3.4, particularly
'3.4b1 on copyright misuse.
57E.g., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, 882 F.2d 1556, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1989)
("When a party seeks to collect monetary damages from a patentee because of alleged
violations of the antitrust laws, it is appropriate to require a higher degree of misconduct
for that damage award than when a party asserts only a defense against an
infringement claim"). See also Senza-Gel Corp. v. Seiffhart, 803 F.2d 661 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (finding different standards for tying depending on whether misuse or antitrust
was involved).
58Lasercomb America v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1990).
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Recently, Judge Posner took a broader view of copyright misuse than his view of
patent misuse in USM. In Assessment Technologies the infringement plaintiff owned a
copyrighted database program that public tax assessors used to collect data about real
property, and that local governments used to store and organize the data.59 The
infringement defendant wanted the raw data for use by real estate brokers and when it
attempted to download that data the plaintiff claimed copyright infringement. While the
database itself was copyrightable, the raw data clearly was not. The court viewed the
infringement action as an attempt by the copyright holder to "sequester" the
uncopyrighted data in its copyrighted database, for the data were not practically
available in any form other than in the database.60 However, there was no showing
that any relevant market was threatened with monopoly. Such an application of misuse
resembles tort law more than antitrust.

59Assessment Technologies v. Wiredata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 2003); 361 F.3d
434 (7th Cir. 2004).
60While some tax assessors made hand-written notes, which would have been in the
public domain, others carried laptop computers to properties and entered the data
directly into the infringement plaintiff's database. As a result, much of the data existed
in no other form than in the database. See 350 F.3d at 645.
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However, "misuse" has independent antitrust relevance even when the scope of
misuse is limited to antitrust violations. The misuse remedial structure differs from the
antitrust structure, making remedies available to those who would not have antitrust
remedies. In a case such as Microsoft, for example,61 the indirect purchaser rule of
Illinois Brick62 barred most damages actions by indirect purchasers, because passedon damages would have to be computed, something that the indirect purchaser rule
prohibits.63 One can only guess, but the amount that Microsoft actually paid in
damages would appear to fall very far short of the amount needed to deter the conduct
that was found unlawful. However, the misuse remedy is different, requiring no passon, or even the computation of damages. When the IP holder has misused its
intellectual property right it can no longer maintain an infringement action against
alleged infringers. Thinking of the consumer harm caused by antitrust violations
involving IP rights as misuse could lead to a more effective set of remedies.64

61United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 f.3d 34, 49 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
952 (2001).
62Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
63See 2 Antitrust Law &346 (2d ed. 2000). However, several states interpreted their
antitrust statutes so as to permit indirect purchaser damage actions against Microsoft.
For a list see Antitrust Law &2412d (2004 Supp).
64In fact, very little of the Microsoft litigation has involved claims of copyright misuse.
See Microsoft Corp. v. Jesse's Computer & Repair, Inc., 211 F.R.D. 681 (M.D.Fla.
2002) (rejecting claim of copyright misuse because there was not a sufficient connection
between the alleged misuse and the infringement claim); Microsoft Corp. v. Computer
Support Services of Carolina, Inc., 123 F.Supp.2d 945 (W.D.N.C. 2000) (dismissing
vague allegations of copyright misuse); Microsoft Corp v. PTI, Inc., 2003 WL 21406291
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2003) (refusing to strike copyright misuse defense).
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Conclusion

Antitrust's first duty is always to ensure that a real injury to competition has been
threatened. As a result, it should not infer power from IP rights too readily, or imagine
anticompetitive consequences when none exists. At the same time, however, antitrust
need not be timid about remedying anticompetitive behavior when it is found, and need
not be detained by IP defenses that are not clearly defined by the intellectual property
statutes or the case law that interprets them. Such an approach is calculated to limit the
tension that exists between antitrust and the intellectual property laws.

